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Introduction
This paper focuses on the confrontation between foreign plantation firms and the
Malaysian state under the New Economic Policy since 1970. Using company archive
material from one firm, United Plantations, which successfully established a new modus
vivendi, the paper compares this case with several others for which professional business
histories are also now available, and for which outcomes were different.1
Within the developing world, Malaysia was relatively late in adopting policies of
economic nationalism, and even under the New Economic Policy developed in response
to the communal riots of May 1969, the government maintained a strong aversion to
forced expropriation.2 There was space for foreign owners to negotiate, to find local allies
and to co-operate with them in constructing new and sustainable systems of shared
ownership and management. The paper examines how and why the strategies developed
by the British agency houses differed from those of three firms which, even during the
colonial period, had substantial elements of non-British ownership: the Anglo-Dutch
Unilever, Franco-Belgian Socfin and Scandinavian United Plantations.
It is already well known that most of the British agency houses which had dominated the
plantations sector during the colonial period chose to resist change. Some succumbed to
hostile takeovers, while others adopted a strategy of reluctant compliance and gradual
disengagement, making a series of deals transferring their shareholdings to Malaysian
parastatals and private buyers.3 What is less well known is that Unilever, Socfin and
United Plantations continued to operate successfully with sustained European
involvement until the turn of the twenty-first century. Indeed, United Plantations
continues to thrive and expand with shared Asian and European ownership and top
management today.
This paper will examine how and why these three firms developed more flexible strategic
responses than the agency houses to the political risks posed by economic nationalism in
Malaysia. Is there any link between the fact that all three had been outsiders to some
degree within the British imperial economy, and the ability they showed after Merdeka
(Independence) to balance the demands of foreign shareholders with those of a fresh
range of local stakeholders? What role, if any, was played by corporate ethical values in
the development of sustainable relationships with employees and their unions,
communities living near plantations, new groups of Asian customers and shareholders,
and the host government?
2The Slow Growth of Economic Nationalism in Malaysia
During the first decade of Malaysian independence following Merdeka in 1957,
economic nationalism had remarkably little impact on the plantations sector. Despite the
publication in Singapore in 1960 of Puthucheary’s powerful indictment of foreign
ownership of the commanding heights of the economy, the Alliance government of
Tunku Abdul Rahman maintained a laissez-faire approach to the private sector and
developed a policy of encouraging further inward investment, especially in import-
substituting manufacturing ventures.4 The country came to be seen as a classic example
of a neo-colony, not only because of the regime’s continuing encouragement of foreign
direct investment, but also because of its neglect of the issue of land reform and its
persistent repression of trade unionism.5
While subsequent research has modified this view, it has by no means overturned it.
White’s work on the period 1942-1957 demonstrated the importance of the long-standing
gulf between the British metropolitan ‘gentlemanly capitalists’ who determined imperial
policy, and the rough-hewn traders, planters and engineers who managed businesses in
Asia. As Malaya began to move towards independence in the early 1950s, it could by no
means be guaranteed that the neo-colonial order would be biased towards the interests of
the British agency houses in particular, rather than towards the wider interests of the
sterling area and of capitalism per se.6 However, more general studies of the Malayan
Emergency which began in 1948, and of local politics in the era of decolonization, show
persuasively how the fear of more radical change helped to draw together the European
planters, tin miners, and colonial administrators on the one hand, and an English-educated
local elite opposed both to communism and to trade union activism, on the other. White’s
work on the period 1957-1970 shows that the rapprochement between these groups
continued to strengthen after Merdeka, fuelled by consultancies, non-executive
directorships and shared sporting interests. Studies of the union movement in the same
period confirm the view that it was firmly restricted and could play only a weak
conciliatory role in the ongoing conflicts of interest between plantation owners and
workers.7
Within this context Malaysia’s plantations sector continued to thrive and grow, especially
through the increased production of palm oil which was emerging as a profitable
alternative to rubber. Following the development of the synthetic rubber industry in the
1940s and 1950s, natural rubber prices had fallen sharply, with no countervailing
reduction in production costs. This point may be demonstrated with the aid of accounting
data from the annual reports of United Plantations, which are available in the firm’s
private archives for almost the entire time series from the firm’s incorporation in 1917 up
to the present day. The information is sufficiently detailed to permit the calculation of
contribution margins for both rubber and palm oil. In the period 1935-1939 these margins
were very similar, at 55 per cent of sales revenue for rubber and 54 per cent for palm oil.
However, by 1965-1969 the margin for rubber had fallen to 27 per cent. Palm oil prices
were under pressure at this time, as the expansion of world and especially Malaysian
supplies outpaced the growth of European demand. Yet a series of innovations in planting
materials and processing methods had brought down costs to such an extent that the
contribution margin remained almost as high as in the pre-war period, at 53 per cent. The
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late 1960s.8
Like their counterparts in the agency houses, United Plantations’ directors had been
extremely worried about political risks in Asia since the outbreak of the Emergency in
June 1948. They began to accumulate stocks of British bonds and Treasury bills,
amounting to just over £1 million by December 1956, and they invested funds generated
from their core operations in new ventures elsewhere. A wholly-owned subsidiary was set
up in southern Africa in 1950 and by 1954 the decision had been taken to transfer this
asset, together with the bonds and Treasury bills, to a new firm, International Plantations
and Finance Limited, which was to be owned directly by United Plantations’ original
shareholders and which was eventually incorporated in the Bahamas in 1957. Meanwhile,
pine and citrus plantations had been established in Swaziland, and experiments were
being made with bananas and cocoa in Ecuador. However, the new ventures struggled to
reach sustained profitability and although citrus production continues in Swaziland, the
Ecuadorean estates succumbed to repeated attacks of fungal disease and were sold off at a
loss in March 1974.9
In 1963 Olof Grut, an engineer with extensive Asian experience, took over as Chairman
at United Plantations, and the firm began to redirect its funds towards Malaysia. This
strategy, implemented initially with great caution, became increasingly strong and
confident as the firm’s directors began to compare and contrast their experience of
tolerant, stable government and economic growth in Malaysia with the growing evidence
of higher political risks elsewhere. In Ecuador, the late 1960s saw mounting fiscal
deficits, soaring inflation levels and frequent regime changes; incompetent government
began to seem a more serious threat than economic nationalism.10 Meanwhile, political
instability and forced ownership changes began to take a startling toll on United
Plantations’ direct competitors in Nigeria, Indonesia and the former Belgian Congo
(Zaire) – the three countries which had been world export leaders in the palm oil industry
before 1960. Indonesia and the Belgian Congo had also been world leaders in research
and development, pioneering the new plant breeding methods and screw presses which
were later applied to best effect in Malaysia.11
In the period 1955-1959, Malayan exports of palm oil averaged 60 thousand tonnes per
annum – a figure dwarfed by the Indonesian, Zairean and Nigerian equivalents of 120,
160, and 180 thousand tonnes respectively. Yet by 1965-1969 Malaysia had overtaken all
three of these rival nations, with an annual export level of 220 thousand tonnes.12
Indonesian production had continued to grow despite the expropriation of Dutch
plantation owners in 1957-1958 and the chaotic economic policies of President Sukarno;
but growth had been very slow and exports averaged just 150 thousand tonnes per annum
in the later period. The fate of the industry in Africa was even worse. Exports from Zaire
began to decline during the ‘Congo crisis’ of 1960-1965, when a bitter power struggle
between the national leaders Patrice Lumumba and Joseph Kasavubu coincided with
secessionist uprisings in the mining regions of Katanga and Kasai. As General Mobutu
struggled to restore central government control, palm oil exports continued falling and
averaged 120 thousand tonnes per annum in the period 1965-1969. Finally, in Nigeria the
heavy levies imposed upon palm oil producers through export duties, Marketing Board
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sector market for palm oil, had already served to reduce annual exports to a level of 110
thousand tonnes by 1965. The outbreak of the Nigerian Civil War in 1967 effectively put
an end to the export trade, which has never recovered.13
Pondering all these developments in the late 1960s, Olof Grut developed a deep respect
for the ‘sagacious statesmanship’ and ‘inspired leadership’ of the Malaysian Prime
Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman. In his annual statements to the shareholders’ general
meetings, his comments on political risk focused on external events: relations with
Indonesia, Singapore, the Philippines and China; the tax implications of changes in local
defence spending following the withdrawal of British and Commonwealth troops from
Malaysia in 1967, and conversely, the welcome decision of Australia and New Zealand to
maintain an ‘advanced defence position in Malaysia’ in 1969. The only indication of
concern about economic nationalism which he gave in these public pronouncements was
an acknowledgement in 1966 of the increasing government pressure for the
Malaysianization of estate executives. This acknowledgement, however, was swiftly
followed by a robust statement about the generally good investment climate in the
country.14
Behind the scenes, United Plantations had already been working steadily since 1946 on
the identification and development of potential senior managers from among their Asian
staff. The company culture had been influenced from the start by the attitudes of the
Danish founder, Aage Westenholz, and his Swedish brother-in-law, Lennart Grut (Olof’s
father), who had both started their careers in Bangkok as members of an enterprising
Scandinavian community which was glad to support the king in his struggle to maintain
independence from both Britain and France.15 Lennart Grut had married the daughter of
the first English professor of architecture at Tokyo University, Josiah Conder, and his
Japanese wife Kume Maeba. During the Second World War Olof had chosen to identify
with his English rather than Japanese or Swedish roots, and had settled in Australia where
he served in the Royal Australian Air Force. In October 1945 he returned to Malaya as a
member of the British Palm Oil Inspection Committee and when he retired from the East
in 1952, he chose to settle in Norfolk where he spent ten peaceful years as an arable
farmer. Despite this evident affection for England, however, Olof continued to feel a pull
towards Asia and visited the estates every year. On becoming Chairman of United
Plantations in 1963 he began to spend still more time in Malaysia, and eventually
returned to live in Penang where he developed close links with the Chinese community.16
During the Japanese Occupation several managers from United Plantations had been
stranded in Malaya. Most were Danish and so were allowed to remain free initially
because of Denmark’s neutral status; yet by 1943 they found themselves facing
persecution and imprisonment. Three escaped and fled to the Cameron Highlands, joining
a small group of fellow Danes from the Sungei Palas hillside tea estate, who had retreated
to a bungalow further up the Brinchang mountain that had fortunately remained beyond
Japanese control. Here they were helped with food and other supplies by the jungle-based
resistance movement, and so survived the war, returning quickly in 1945 to United
Plantations’ estates in the lowlands of Perak, able and willing to take up the task of
reconstruction. This story has entered deeply into the company’s culture together with the
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stranded Danes. Speldewinde joined United Plantations as its first Asian planting
assistant (or management trainee) in June 1946, and quickly proved to be an effective yet
relaxed leader, extremely popular with his staff, and capable of generating and
implementing innovative practical ideas. He eventually rose to become the first General
Manager of United International Enterprises (Malaysia) Limited, a Danish-Malaysian
joint venture formed in 1987 to transform an old sugar plantation into a new palm oil
estate.17
United Plantations’ good experience with Speldewinde encouraged the firm to recruit and
develop more Asian managers, and by 1965 eleven long-standing staff had been
promoted to the rank of assistant, with a further group of three new recruits enrolled on a
pioneering Cadet Scheme which offered them a two-year  management training
programme including nine months spent in Denmark. One of these recruits, Ho Dua
Tiam, is now the Senior Executive Director of United Plantations.18 For this firm, at least,
the exhortations of economic nationalists to Malaysianize their management were falling
on open ears. However, the process of Malaysianization was not entirely smooth. Like
their agency house competitors, United Plantations found it easy to identify Eurasian,
Indian and Chinese candidates for promotion and management development, but had
more difficulty obtaining and retaining suitable recruits from among the rapidly growing
ranks of bumiputera (ethnic Malay and other indigenous) secondary-school and
university graduates.19 This was soon to become a highly significant issue, with the
launch of Malaysia’s New Economic Policy following the inter-ethnic riots of 13 May
1969.
The New Economic Policy
The New Economic Policy, which was formally unveiled by the Department of National
Unity in its directive of 18 March 1970, was nationalist mainly in the sense of promoting
national unity, rather than of struggling to throw off foreign control. Its two main aims
were to eradicate poverty and to restructure Malaysian society so as to reduce the divisive
identification of race with economic role. However, the policy did impact upon foreign
firms in a new and confrontational way through its explicit aim of enabling Malaysians to
acquire a 70 per cent share in these firms’ ownership by 1990, including a 30 per cent
share reserved for bumiputeras. This was a major departure from previous policy
although the ideas behind it were not altogether new. As Nick White has shown, the
general idea of giving bumiputeras an ownership stake in Malaysia’s export sector was
already present in government policy well before 1970. Two Bumiputera Economic
Congresses were held, in 1965 and in 1968, which led to the establishment of Bank
Bumiputera and of Pernas (Permodalan Nasional Berhad), a national equity fund charged
with investing on behalf of the bumiputeras. Also in 1965 and in 1968, calls were made
for the takeover of British firms at the General Assembly of the ruling party, UMNO.
Meanwhile Tun Abdul Razak, who was to become the architect of the new Economic
Policy as head of the National Operations Council formed immediately after the 1969
riots, and who succeeded Tunku Abdul Rahman as Prime Minister in September 1970,
was already developing policies favourable to bumiputeras.20
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Razak  fostered a rapid growth in the amount of land allocated to FELDA smallholder
resettlement schemes, which offered bumiputeras a share in new export-oriented
agricultural ventures. This share would be paid for, month by month, through cash
deductions from sales revenues. The Federal Land Development Authority, first
established in 1956, had developed 1,700 hectares of rubber smallholdings between 1957
and 1959.  From 1960 to 1964, by contrast, a further 43,400 hectares were developed,
including 7,200 hectares planted with oil palms in centrally-administered schemes which
were managed in a similar way to plantation estates, but owned by the people who
worked on them. Meanwhile, little or no extra land had been allocated to European-
owned plantations since the outbreak of the Second World War, although as marginal
reserve land was brought into cultivation between 1940 and 1975 their total planted area
did rise by 3 per cent, from 887,000 to 918,000 hectares.21
The New Economic Policy shifted the government’s approach to the foreign-owned
plantations sector from containment to confrontation. The key defining moment came in
late 1973 with the publication of the mid-term review of the Second Malaysia Plan. The
Plan covered only the five years 1971-1975, but the review generated a twenty-year
Outline Perspective Plan setting eight targets for production, employment, education and
welfare gains to be met by 1990. Among these targets were the reduction of inequality in
income distribution, and ‘the creation of a commercial and industrial community among
Malays and other indigenous people in order that, within one generation, they will own
and manage at least 30 per cent of the total commercial and industrial activities of the
country in all categories and scales of operation’. In order to meet this target, and to allow
for a further 40 per cent stake for Malaysians of Indian and Chinese ethnic origin, foreign
ownership would have to fall from 61 per cent to 30 per cent of the nation’s private-
sector capital assets by 1990. The freeze on new land allocations meant that this
restructuring could not be achieved relatively painlessly in the course of expansion. It
would have to be pushed through by compulsory share purchase orders or, as in fact
happened, by sales of shares at market-clearing prices through private negotiations or on
the stock markets.22
Strategic Withdrawal of British Plantation Firms
As White has shown, the agency houses viewed the prospect of shared British-Malaysian
ownership with dismay. They were distrustful of established Chinese business leaders
and feared that local directors would meddle needlessly with their own firms’ operations
or worse still, introduce corrupt practices.23 Like the directors of United Plantations in the
1950s, the directors of British agency houses in the 1960s took steps to separate out the
legal ownership and control of assets held in Malaysia from those held elsewhere in the
world. For example, Boustead and Company’s London subsidiary, Edward Boustead and
Company, became wholly independent of its Malaysian parent in 1960; and the Guthrie
Corporation Limited, formed through a merger between the formerly loosely-linked
Guthrie Estates Agency Limited group of plantation firms in 1965, immediately
established a Malaysian subsidiary, Guthrie Ropel Sendiarian Berhad, to which they
intended to transfer their local assets in preparation for placing shares with Malaysian
private investors and bumiputera investment institutions.24
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with the New Economic Policy. However, their British directors remained deeply
reluctant to give up control. They found numerous reasons to delay making public share
issues or placing large tranches of shares privately with institutions like Pernas, FELDA,
and the savings funds Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera and Lembaga Urusan dan
Tabung Haji. When they did begin to sell shares in the mid-1970s, and to appoint
Malaysian Directors to represent the new participants in ownership, the agency houses
sought to attract former diplomats, civil servants and others whom they felt would be
amenable to expatriate British influence.25
A celebrated challenge was made to this practice in the case of Sime Darby in 1976, as a
result of which the British Chairman resigned and was replaced by the former Malaysian
Minister of Finance Tun Tan Siew Sin. At the same time three new directors nominated
by Asian shareholders joined the Board. Sime Darby moved its domicile from Britain to
Malaysia in 1979 and made a dramatic bid to take over the Guthrie Corporation,
succeeding in buying up over 45 per cent of the firm’s shares on the open market. In 1980
Sime Darby transferred its stake in Guthrie to Pernas, which proceeded to conduct a £100
million ‘dawn raid’ on the London Stock Exchange in September 1981, acquiring a
controlling interest in the company without the prior knowledge or consent of Guthrie’s
management. More peaceful negotiations followed swiftly with two other leading agency
houses, Barlows and Harrisons & Crosfield, which recognised the need for compliance
with government policy. Both firms had sold a controlling stake in their Malaysian
operations by the end of 1981, but then found the position of a minority shareholder
extremely uncomfortable. Barlows divested completely in 1983, and Harrisons’ followed
in 1989. One final agency house, Boustead Limited, had sold its Malaysian plantations
outright in 1976 to an Asian bank, anticipating the general trend in which British
investors chose to withdraw completely rather than to share ownership and give up
control. Sadly, this strategy did not lead to fresh business successes as capital was
redeployed towards the developed industrial countries of Western Europe and North
America. Many firms struggled and failed during the 1990s to cope with the twin
challenges of entering new sectors, for example advanced chemicals manufacturing or
financial services, and satisfying the needs of the British capital markets for short-term
financial performance.26
The New Economic Policy Evolves
Following the withdrawal of the British agency houses, together with similar
developments outside the plantations sector, the Malaysian government could safely
conclude that the commanding heights of the Malaysian economy had already been
captured by 1986, when an economic downturn prompted Prime Minister Dr Mahathir
Mohamad to suspend the restructuring targets of the New Economic Policy. Under the
New Development Policy or ‘Vision 2020’ launched in 1991, foreign direct investment
became openly welcome once again. The bumiputera commercial and industrial
community, meanwhile, was urged to look beyond the quantity of shares held and to
maximize the quality of their participation in the economy by improving the profitability
of the enterprises in which they were participating.27 Even before this, Mahathir’s Look
East, Malaysia Incorporated, and privatization policies (launched in 1983) had signalled a
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management methods. Dr Kenichi Ohmae of McKinsey & Co., a world-renowned
business guru, became a consultant to the Malaysian government. Labour laws were
tightened in 1980 to restrict union activity still further than before, and Japanese-style
quality circles and in-house unions were encouraged as means of boosting productivity.
From the late 1970s onwards, labour shortages were eased by a tacit government policy
of allowing immigration from Indonesia, Southern Thailand, and the Southern
Philippines. Just as the agency houses were withdrawing, the Malaysian government was
setting the scene for renewed capitalist growth in the plantations sector, as elsewhere.28
What the agency houses overlooked, in their focus on ownership and control, were the
great opportunities for renewed growth and profits, even in the 1970s in Malaysia. The
New Economic Policy envisioned a process of export-led industrialization and
agricultural growth that would ease the achievement of key redistributive aims. It
confirmed the policy shift introduced by the Investment Incentives Act of 1968, which
had allowed for the granting of tax credits to export-oriented firms which made capital-
intensive innovations, and which was accompanied by the exemption of processed oil
palm products from the 7.5 per cent export duty levied on crude palm oil. The early
nationalists’ emphasis on import substitution had been banished, returning only briefly in
1980-1985 before being abandoned, apparently permanently. The results of this policy
shift were clear. Malaysian real GDP grew by over 7 per cent per annum throughout the
1970s, as compared with a growth rate of 5 per cent in 1966-1970 and 1981-1985, both
periods when the government was emphasizing import substitution. The renewed
emphasis on export-oriented industrialization, and the relaxation of the policy of
indigenization of ownership from 1986, brought the growth rate back up towards 7 per
cent again. Meanwhile, Malaysia remained among the top four nations in terms of its
share of all FDI flowing into developing countries. In 1975-1980 Malaysia attracted an
annual average of US $520 million of new foreign direct investment, 7 per cent of all
inflows to developing countries and 2 per cent of all FDI worldwide. By 1990-1996
Malaysia’s annual inflow had risen to US $4,300 million, 6 per cent of all inflows to
developing countries and still 2 per cent of all FDI worldwide.29
Much of the inflow of foreign capital into Malaysia in the 1970s and 1980s came from
Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan, and was directed into specialized export
processing ventures. Some British and American investors were also attracted by the tax
and tariff exemptions, and prospects of unchallenged control over equity, offered for such
ventures.30 The plantation industry is not traditionally seen as having any natural
connection with such activities. However, the 1960s switch from rubber to palm oil as the
main plantation crop had brought with it the need for plantation firms to develop
engineering skills, for palm oil can only be extracted from the fruit of the oil palm by a
long and complex process. The development of Malaysian economic ties with Japan and
with other Asian nations during the 1970s and 1980s also brought new opportunities for
palm oil producers, for as the European market for edible oils and soaps stagnated, the
purchasing power of potential Asian consumers was growing rapidly. In the case of the
palm oil industry, Malaysian economic nationalism could and did express itself in
striving to become the world’s leading producer, in terms of quality as well as quantity;
and in developing a refineries industry that could supply the needs of Asian end users
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Unilever and United Plantations – the three European plantation firms which weathered
the share-buying storms of the early 1980s, and took the trouble to establish a new modus
vivendi with Malaysian shareholders – were also distinguished by their exceptionally high
ability to contribute to these nationalist aims, through their long experience of the palm
oil industry and their shared dedication to the twin causes of mechanization and market
development.31
Three European Survivors
At the time of Pernas’ ‘dawn raid’ on Guthrie in 1981, Socfin controlled about 28,000
hectares of oil palm plantations in Malaysia; Unilever, through its subsidiary Pamol
Plantations Sendirian Berhad, had 14,000; and United Plantations had 13,000. Together
they accounted for 9 per cent of the oil palms in Malaysia’s estates sector, and 5 per cent
of the area planted to oil palms by all growers, including FELDA and the other state-
sponsored resettlement schemes. Compared with Guthrie’s 120,000 hectares, Harrisons’
85,000 hectares, and Sime Darby’s 77,000 hectares, their holdings were small indeed.32
However, they were not so small as to pass beneath the radar of the nationalists. United
Plantations’ Scandinavian shareholders sold a controlling interest in their company to
Kumpulan FIMA Berhad in 1982, and although Unilever was not under pressure to give
up control of Pamol Plantations Sdn. Bhd., this firm was already involved in a joint
venture with the Sabah Land Development Authority for the development of its newer
estates in Sabah. By the time Pamol was finally sold to Palmco, a subsidiary of the
Chinese-Malaysian IOI Corporation Berhad in January 2003, the Sabah estates had
expanded to cover 14,000 hectares and accounted for 62 per cent of its land holdings.33
The case of the Socfin group is different because it was controlled by the Fabri family of
Luxemburg, the Franco-Belgian Rivaud family and the French Bolloré family, so that its
shares were not publicly quoted. Although the group’s affairs have long been shrouded in
secrecy, it appears that some attempt was made to comply with the New Economic Policy
in that one of the group’s companies, New Selangor Plantations Sendirian Berhad, did
gradually sell off the 13,000 hectares which it owned. These sales occurred from the mid-
1980s to the early 1990s and took advantage of the booming demand from property
speculators for land near Kuala Lumpur. Socfin’s remaining 15,000 hectares remained in
the possession of a second company, Socfin Plantations Berhad, a subsidiary of the group
holding company Plantations des Terres Rouges, until 2004, when its 12,000 hectares in
Johor were sold to Achi Jaya Plantations and the 3,000 hectare Lima Blas Estate in
northern Selangor was sold to United Plantations Berhad.34
Socfin’s long survival may partly have been related to the fact that, like Olof Grut at
United Plantations, a number of senior Socfin staff were happy to mix socially across
racial boundaries and to become long-term residents of Malaysia. The novelists Henri
Fauconnier and Pierre Boulle, whose books take the reader beneath the surface of local
societies, began their careers with Socfin in Malaysia. After Merdeka, Socfin planters
including Pierre Laine, Tan Sri Victor Hutson and the last of the local Chief Executives,
Jeremy Diamond, married or acquired adoptive families locally. Victor Hutson, an
Irishman who arrived in Malaysia as a British Army officer in 1945, was an early
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advocate of localization of senior management and became a close personal friend of
Tunku Abdul Rahman, whom he first met in 1953 at a football match. With the Prime
Minister’s encouragement, Hutson set up the Zoo Negara (National Zoo), the Outward
Bound Trust in the Perak coastal town of Lumut, and the Malaysian branch of the Royal
Commonwealth Society. Jeremy Diamond, while living at Socfin’s Rantau Panjang
Estate in the 1980s, did valuable conservation work on Fauconnier’s pioneering avenue
of oil palms, established in 1911 in Malaysia’s first commercial trial of what was then an
exotic crop. He also worked to establish a nature conservation zone at Lima Blas Estate
when based there at the end of the 1990s.35
Unilever’s company culture was hardly noted for its enthusiasm for conservation or for
its appreciation of non-European peoples and their values, especially before the Second
World War when the firm’s African activities involved demands for monopolistic
concessions in the Gold Coast (Ghana), Nigeria and Sierra Leone, and association with an
exceptionally rapacious and repressive regime in the Belgian Congo. However, within
pre-war Malaya the firm was known (if at all) as a manufacturer of soap and other
consumer goods, and it was almost by chance, through seeking a profitable way to spend
£205,000 due from local war damage claims in 1947, that Unilever decided to enter the
plantations industry with the purchase of a small estate in Johor. By this time the firm’s
image and culture were changing rapidly. In partnership with Belgian government
scientists Unilever had made substantial investments from the 1930s to the 1950s in
developing new plant breeding and palm oil mill extraction techniques in the Belgian
Congo. These innovations could now be transferred to Malaysia, where the more
favourable investment climate ensured that they could contribute effectively to the
process of export-led growth and industrialization, thus helping the nationalists to realize
some of their key ambitions.36
At Unilever’s corporate headquarters in England and the Netherlands, earlier ambitions
of Third World social engineering had been abandoned and the firm was refocusing on its
core strengths of manufacturing and technical innovation. The process of innovation was
becoming increasingly systematic, scientific and market-focused as the firm began to
depart from its pre-war policy of letting staff develop their technical knowledge ‘on the
job’ and apply it primarily to solve immediate operational problems. Within the
Plantations Group, the rise of Leslie Davidson from the mid-1960s onwards brought a
new managerial openness to Asian culture. When working in Malaysia, Davidson did not
care to attend the traditional expatriate Sunday curry parties unless Asians were also
invited. In 1976 Davidson was appointed group vice-chairman and from 1979 he was
reporting to T. Thomas, the former chairman of Hindustan Lever, who was the first Asian
main board director of Unilever.37
Like Unilever, United Plantations endeared itself to the Malaysian government under the
New Economic Policy by embracing the nationalists’ aim of developing the quality and
marketability of the nation’s palm oil exports. Unilever was able to do this through first-
hand knowledge of the requirements of the European soap, detergents and edible oils
processing industries. For United Plantations, the task was more difficult. The firm was
relatively small and, until it bought a 25 per cent stake in the Danish refiner Aarhus Olie
in 1978, it had no direct links to the European oil-processing industries. Børge Bek-
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Nielsen, who became United Plantations’ chief engineer in 1959, rising to become senior
executive director in 1971 and chairman in 1978, followed a consistent policy of
watching the competition, learning, adopting and adapting new techniques as soon as
their market advantages had been clearly established. He developed firm friendships with
Leslie Davidson and other industry figures who respected his passion for innovation and
his dislike of turnkey solutions.38
Within United Plantations, one of Bek-Nielsen’s closest friendships was with S. ‘Krish’
Krishnan, a Malaysian who had studied chemical engineering in India and, like Olof
Grut, shared his enthusiasm for developing new products for Asian consumers. In 1970
Krishnan undertook a four-month study tour of refineries in India and in Europe, which
gave him the idea of using the relatively untried technique of fractionation to make a
palm-oil-based form of vanaspathi, an extremely popular vegetarian shortening in India,
where it was used as an alternative to butterfat ghee. Within a year United Plantations had
formed a joint venture with the Tata Oil Mills Company of Bombay to build a refinery at
their Jendarata estate in Lower Perak. In order to gain the freedom to supply their own
crude palm oil to the new refinery, United Plantations resigned from the long-established
Malayan Palm Oil Pool, dominated by Guthrie, which had channelled all sales through
London. This act in turn dissolved the Pool, allowing FELDA too to gain independence
and shift sales decisions to Kuala Lumpur. Malaysia’s palm oil exports to a wide range of
Asian nations have continued to grow rapidly from 1971 until the present day, with some
additional help from Bek-Nielsen during the late 1980s ‘War of Oils’ when American
soyabean oil exporters, who by then had become the industry’s main competitors,
launched a propaganda campaign against palm oil in the English-language media. Bek-
Nielsen’s effectiveness as an international ambassador for the Malaysian palm oil
industry, coupled with his sustained support for the New Economic Policy aim of
industrialization and for the development of Asian rather than European trading
networks, explains why he and his sons have continued to be welcome business guests in
Malaysia to this day.39
One obvious sign of the high esteem in which Bek-Nielsen and his firm were held by
Malaysian politicians is the fact that in this case, the bumiputera takeover was long
delayed and very amicably concluded. The Malaysian buyers in 1982 valued United
Plantations’ estates at roughly double the price per hectare paid for Guthrie’s, Barlows’
and Harrisons’ estates the previous year. Even more importantly, the takeover was made
not by Pernas, as usual, but instead by a consortium of savings and investment funds led
by the state-owned company Food Industries of Malaysia Berhad (FIMA). FIMA’s
chairman, Dato’ (now Tan Sri) Haji Basir bin Ismail, was a close friend of Dr Mahathir
Mohamad, who had himself been chairman of FIMA until he became Prime Minister in
1981. This was not a classic ‘crony capitalist’ relationship because Basir was well known
for his efficiency as a manager and his genuine interest in agricultural development,
which he had studied at Durham University and Wye College in the UK, and practiced
for many years in his home state of Johor. In 1982 he became the first Asian chairman of
the Rubber Growers’ Association and he is currently chairman of the Malaysian Palm Oil
Board.40
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Bek and Basir soon discovered that they shared a common interest, not only in innovation
but also in workforce welfare, and they maintained a fruitful working partnership for
twenty years with Basir as chairman, and Bek-Nielsen as senior executive director of
United Plantations. The relationship between them endured even though, in September
1990, FIMA was privatized through a management buyout, and in 1991 the Malaysian
government allowed the original Scandinavian shareholders, together with their more
recent business partner Aarhus Olie, to buy back a controlling share of United
Plantations. By this time, the firm had expanded its land holdings to 23,000 hectares, and
the Scandinavian shareholders had set up a second plantation enterprise as a joint venture
with the Perak State Agricultural Development Corporation, converting 9,000 hectares of
abandoned sugar plantings to oil palms. For United Plantations’ original owners and top
managers, the New Economic Policy had simply ushered in a new era of expansion, and
stimulated their entry into fresh and fruitful partnerships with Asians.41
United Plantations’ positive experience of economic nationalism is clearly linked to the
company’s own cultural openness and to the positive attitudes of leaders like Olof Grut
and Børge Bek-Nielsen to the legitimate aspirations of the nationalists. These leaders’
approach went well beyond the rather grudging compliance which was characteristic of
the agency houses, and which current sceptics think typical of most firms endeavouring
to practice ‘corporate social responsibility’. For Børge Bek-Nielsen, a commitment to
high levels of medical provision for the workforce, schools, temples and mosques, clean
water and decent living conditions, was a fundamental part not only of his personal
philosophy but also of the management culture established by the firm’s original founder,
Aage Westenholz. He treasured a copy of an article published by Westenholz in 1922
which drew on the ideas on co-operation of the nineteenth-century Lutheran pastor,
Danish patriot and social reformer N.F.S. Grundtvig, founder of the Folk High School
movement, to develop a case for co-operation between the owners and employees of a
capitalist enterprise. At a time when the government was doing little to enforce its own
guidelines on plantation working conditions and living standards, therefore, United
Plantations prided itself on going well beyond the guidelines to provide an outstanding
example of best practice. This philosophy, enhanced with a growing commitment to
environmental conservation, continues to animate the firm under the current chairman,
Tan Sri Datuk Dr. Johari bin Mat, and chief executive Ho Dua Tiam, with Bek-Nielsen’s
sons Carl and Martin, and Basir’s son Ahmad Riza, continuing to serve on the board of
directors. The philosophy is by no means wasteful or unprofitable: the pre-tax return on
net capital employed by United Plantations for the past ten years has averaged 17 per
cent, as compared with 16 per cent achieved by Harrisons & Crosfield, and 9 per cent by
the Guthrie Corporation, in the last ten years before the exit of their British investors.42
Conclusion
This paper has compared and contrasted the strategies developed by the British agency
houses and other European firms in response to the intensification of Malaysian
economic nationalism since 1970. In contrast to the typical agency-house strategy of
reluctant compliance with changing national policies, resulting in the complete exit of
British investors by 1990, the examples of Socfin, Unilever and United Plantations have
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been explored to show how firms could embrace rather than resist the new ethics of
nationalist development.
In Unilever’s case, the firm’s commitment to economic development and the
development of local markets, supported by an exceptionally high level of technical
expertise, have been shown to explain why the Malaysian government tolerated a
continuingly high level of foreign ownership and control. In Socfin’s case, limitations of
source material preclude a detailed analysis although it is clear that personal friendships
and political connections reinforced the defensive strength provided by the firm’s
complex family-dominated ownership structure, allowing the group to weather the storm
of economic nationalism and to sell its properties at times and prices of its own choosing.
Finally, in the case of United Plantations, a positive enthusiasm for employee welfare and
local economic development has been shown to be rooted in the founders’ earliest ideals.
This enthusiasm underpinned the effectiveness of Børge Bek-Nielsen both as an
innovator and as an ambassador for Malaysia’s palm oil industry abroad, earning him and
the original Scandinavian investors the opportunity to retain and expand their
involvement in Malaysia over the long term.
In all three cases, the firms developed flexible strategies embracing some key aims of the
economic nationalists. Their managers made new local friendships and partnerships.
United Plantations went furthest of all, exceeding the demands of the nationalists by
improving the welfare of their workers, as well as furthering the cause of national
economic development. In so doing they enhanced their corporate reputation, built
employee loyalty and developed a web of other local relationships that helped to sustain
their commercial success. They became successful practitioners of corporate social
responsibility long before the term had been invented.
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